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DISTRIBUTION, AND ALLOCATION OF TAXES  
 





There is considerable disagreement about how taxes, especially high marginal tax 
rates on those with large incomes, influence economic performance and the distribution 
of income. This paper uses data on marginal tax rates since 1980 for countries that have a 
personal income tax to analyze this topic. Section II uses economic theory to analyze the 
linkage between marginal tax rates and economic performance and considers a number of 
factors that complicate the measurement of that impact. Section III presents country data 
on the top marginal tax rates imposed during 1980-2002 and illustrates the reduction in 
the highest marginal rates since 1985. Section IV analyzes the impact of high marginal 
tax rates on economic growth and Section V focuses on how reductions in marginal tax 
rates, particularly the highest rates, influence income inequality and the share of the 
personal income tax paid by various income groups. The final section summarizes the 
findings of this study. 
 
 
II. MARGINAL TAX RATES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
 
 
From an economic viewpoint, marginal tax rates are considered particularly 
important because they affect the incentive of individuals to earn additional income.  As 
marginal tax rates rise, individuals get to keep less and less of their additional earnings.  
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High marginal tax rates influence economic performance in at least three major 
ways. First, high marginal rates discourage work effort. As taxes reduce the amount of 
additional earnings that one is permitted to keep, individuals tend to work and earn less. 
People will make this adjustment in various ways.  Some, for example those with a 
working spouse, may drop out of the labor force.  Others will respond by working fewer 
hours per week.  Still others will decide to take more lengthy vacations, forgo overtime 
opportunities, retire earlier, or forget about pursuing that promising but risky business 
venture. In some cases, high tax rates will even drive highly productive citizens to other 
countries where taxes are lower. For example, when the incomes of athletes, skilled 
professionals, and business entrepreneurs are not country dependent, they often re-locate 
from high to low tax countries. 
Second, high marginal tax rates distort price signals and encourage individuals to 
substitute less-desired but tax-deductible goods for non-deductible ones that are more-
desired. Goods and services may be tax-deductible as the result of either the design of the 
tax structure or because they appear as a legitimate business expense. In both cases, the 
personal costs of purchasing the deductible items will be lower than both society’s cost of 
supplying the items and the cost of purchasing nondeductible goods of similar price.   
The higher an individual’s effective marginal tax rate, the cheaper the personal cost of the 
deductible item. This incentive structure will induce persons in high-tax brackets to spend 
excessively on plush offices, professional conferences held in favorite vacation spots, 
business entertainment, luxury cars used for business purposes, and numerous other 
deductible items.  Persons in high tax brackets will often purchase such items even when 
they are valued less than their production costs. Scarce resources are wasted producing 
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goods that are not valued as much as other things that could have been produced instead. 
As a result, living standards will fall short of their potential.    
Third, high tax rates will reduce the incentive of people to invest in both physical 
and human capital. When tax rates are high, foreign investors will look for other places to 
put their money, and domestic investors will look for investment projects abroad where 
taxes are lower. High marginal rates will also reduce the incentive to invest in education 
and skill development. After all, high tax rates mean that investors in human capital, like 
their physical capital counterparts, are unable to capture a substantial share of the returns 
from their investment. Furthermore, domestic investors will direct more of their 
investments into hobby businesses (like collecting antiques, raising horses, or giving golf 
lessons) that may not earn much money but are enjoyable and have tax-shelter 
advantages. This too, will divert resources away from projects with higher rates of return 
but fewer tax-avoidance benefits. Again, scarce capital will be wasted and resources 
channeled away from their most productive uses.  
In summary, theory indicates that high marginal tax rates will reduce the supply 
of both labor and capital, and adversely affect the efficiency of resource use. These 
negative side effects are likely to be particularly strong when marginal tax rates are 
exceedingly high. Thus, one would expect countries with high marginal tax rates to grow 
less rapidly and fail to realize their full potential.  Similarly, one would expect that 
increases in marginal tax rates would be negatively related with economic growth. If 
marginal tax rates are already high, the impact of rate increases is likely to be particularly 
destructive. 
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While theory predicts that there will be a negative relationship between marginal 
tax rates and the growth rate of an economy, it also suggests several factors that will 
complicate measurement of the linkage. First, there is the difference between the short 
run and long run response to a change in marginal rates. To the extent that an increase in 
marginal tax rates reduces the supply of labor and capital, it will tend to slow the growth 
of real GDP. But, these responses will take time and the short-run response may be a 
misleading indicator of what will happen in the long run. Clearly, the labor supply 
response will generally be smaller in the short run than in the long run. For example, 
most people who have previously trained and developed skills for a career of market 
work are likely to remain in the labor force even if higher marginal tax rates substantially 
reduce the return from their prior investment.  Thus, the short-run labor supply response 
to a change in marginal tax rates is likely to be small. This is consistent with the 
empirical findings. Most studies of this topic estimate that the elasticity of labor supply is 
between 0.1 and 0.2.1   This implies that higher marginal tax rates that reduced wages by 
10 percent would reduce the quantity of labor supplied by between 1 percent and 2 
percent. 
In the long run, however, the labor supply response will be larger, perhaps 
substantially larger.2 As a result of the high marginal rates, future labor force participants 
have less incentive to invest and acquire the education and training required for high-
paying jobs, particularly if those jobs are stressful and difficult to perform. In contrast, 
people have more incentive to prepare for jobs that are interesting and provide substantial 
non pecuniary, and therefore untaxed, benefits. With time, adjustments of this type will 
tend to reduce the quality and productivity of the labor force by larger and larger 
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amounts.  But they are likely to take a decade or more and, as a result, a lengthy time 
period will pass before the full labor supply response will be observed. Thus, when 
seeking to isolate the impact of changes in marginal tax rates, it is important to analyze 
their impact on growth over periods of a decade or more. 
Second, GDP figures will often fail to register the negative impact of the price 
distortions accompanying high marginal tax rates. GDP registers the expenditures and 
costs of the goods and services produced even if that exceeds the value derived by the 
consumer. If taxpayers purchase deductible items that they value less than their cost 
because their personal cost is low, the full costs of such items will nonetheless be added 
to GDP.  For example, if a taxpayer in a 60 percent marginal tax bracket purchases a 
$50,000 automobile even though he or she values the car at only $25,000, the purchase of 
the car will nonetheless add $50,000 to GDP.  Because GDP records the costs of 
production rather than the value to the consumer, both GDP and its growth rate will 
understate the adverse side effects of high marginal tax rates. 
Third, the linkage between marginal tax rates and GDP growth may also be 
weakened by the pattern of government expenditures. Several countries impose high 
marginal tax rates in order to derive revenues that are utilized to subsidize child care 
services, retirement benefits and payments to persons not working. Suppose that a 
country increases its marginal tax rates in order to subsidize child care services for 
working-age parents.  While the higher marginal tax rates tend to reduce labor supply, 
subsidies for childcare services act as an offsetting factor by making it less costly for 
adults with children to engage in market work. The net effect on labor supply is likely to 
be small. Further, the policy change will increase the share of childcare services provided 
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by the government (and market suppliers) relative to the share supplied within the 
household sector.  Because the former adds to GDP but the latter does not, the higher 
taxes that subsidize and provide child care services may actually increase income as 
measured by GDP.  
Alternatively, suppose that taxes are increased in order to provide more generous 
benefits to retirees and/or unemployed workers.  The more generous retirement benefits 
would encourage more workers to retire earlier and the more generous unemployment 
benefits would lead to more lengthy periods of job search and higher rates of 
unemployment.  Both of these expenditures would tend to reduce the effective supply of 
labor and thereby reinforce the impact of the higher marginal tax rates.  In contrast with 
the expenditures on childcare services, these expenditures would tend to amplify the 
negative relationship between higher marginal tax rates and the quantity of labor 
supplied.  Thus, variations in the pattern of expenditures accompanying differences in 
marginal tax rates will also influence both labor supply and the expected impact on the 
growth rate of income as measured by real GDP. 
The impact of marginal tax rates will be greatest in the highest tax brackets.  It is 
in the high tax brackets where changes in tax rates will exert their largest affects on both 
labor supply and tax avoidance activities. Furthermore, as the Laffer curve analysis 
indicates, marginal tax rates can be pushed so high that they will actually reduce the 
revenues derived from the tax.  Obviously, marginal tax rates above the revenue 
maximum level are highly inefficient. They reduce both aggregate output and the revenue 
derived by the government. But tax rates near the revenue maximum point are also 
extremely inefficient. As rates are increased toward the revenue maximum point, the 
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higher tax rates will squeeze out substantial amounts of economic activity relative to the 
additional revenue generated. Thus, measured in terms of lost output, these additional 
revenues are very costly. Because the most severe side effects of taxes will be exerted by 
the highest marginal rates, our empirical analysis will focus on these rates.  
 
III.  MARGINAL TAX RATES, 1980-2002 
 
We have collected data for seventy-seven countries that levied a personal income 
tax throughout 1980-2002.3  As Table 1 shows, there has been a dramatic change in the 
top marginal tax rate levied by these countries during the last two decades. The average 
top marginal tax rate in 1980 was 61.3 percent, and the parallel figure in 1985 was only 
slightly lower.  But, the average top rate declined to 48.5 percent in 1990 and to 40.8 
percent in 1995.  Thus, the average top marginal tax rate among the seventy-seven 
countries declined by almost 20 percentage points between 1985 and 1995. And the trend 
has continued; the average top rate receded to 37.1 percent in 2002.  The median top 
marginal tax rate followed a similar path. 
High marginal tax rates will exert less impact on economic performance if they 
apply only at extremely high levels of income. In order to consider the potential 
importance of this factor, the rating matrix used in the Economic Freedom of the World 
(EFW) index was used to adjust for the income level at which the top rate initially 
applies.4 This matrix assigns ratings on a zero-to-ten scale based on both the top marginal 
tax rate and the level of income at which it initially takes affect. Countries with the 
lowest marginal tax rates are assigned the highest ratings, while countries with high top 
 8
marginal tax rates that take affect at low levels of income are rated the lowest. This 
matrix showing the zero-to-ten ratings for the various top marginal tax rate and income 
level categories is presented in Appendix Table A1.  Appendix Table A2 presents both 
the top marginal income tax rate and the rating for the 77 countries of our study for 
various years during 1980-2002. 
While many countries have reduced their top marginal rates substantially,  some 
countries have maintained persistently high rates throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Table 
2 presents the list of 14 countries with top marginal income tax rates of 50 percent or 
more throughout 1980-1995. Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, and  Japan head this list 
of persistently high tax countries. On average, the top marginal tax rate of these countries 
exceeded 60 percent during 1980-1995.  
In some countries, payroll taxes are levied either at all levels of income or at 
income levels that are well above the tax bracket where the top marginal rate begins to 
apply.  When this is the case, the payroll tax rate will increase the top marginal rate 
applicable to earnings.  In some cases, the increase in the top marginal rate is substantial.  
Since 1990, we have been able to calculate a top marginal tax rate that includes the 
payroll tax as well as the personal income tax. These figures are included in Table A3 of 
the Appendix.  
Table 3 indicates countries during 1990-2000 with high and low marginal tax 
rates based on the inclusion of both the personal income and payroll tax.  Once the 
payroll tax was integrated into the calculation, there were nine countries with top 
marginal tax rates of 60 percent or more throughout the 1990-2000 period. At the other 
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end of the spectrum, there were 13 countries with top marginal rates (including the 
payroll tax) of 40 percent or less throughout the 1990s. 
 
IV. TOP MARGINAL TAX RATES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
The dramatic changes in the highest marginal tax rates during the last two decades 
provide something like a natural experiment. The top marginal rates in some countries 
remained at high levels—50 percent or more—throughout the 1980s and most of the 
1990s. Other countries had top marginal rates that were substantially lower in the 1990s 
than the 1980s. Was there any difference in the economic performance of the two 
groups?  How did the growth rates of the countries that sharply reduced their top rates 
compare with the growth of those that maintained high rates?  This section will address 
these questions.  
A. Economic Growth of the High Versus Low Tax Countries: 1990s 
How did the high tax countries during the 1990s perform relative to those with 
low tax rates?  As Table 4 shows, the nine countries with top marginal tax rates 
(including the payroll tax) of 60 percent or more during the 1990s grew at an average 
annual rate of 0.38 percent during 1990-2002, down from 1.35 percent during the 1980s. 
Denmark's growth rate of 1.86 percent was the highest among those in the high-tax 
group. Eight of the nine high tax countries, again Denmark was the exception, grew more 
slowly during 1990-2002 than during the 1980s. 
On the other hand, the 13 countries with a top marginal income tax rate of 40 
percent or less (including the payroll tax) grew at an average annual rate of 2.08 percent 
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during 1990-2002, up from 1.58 percent during the 1980s. Thus, the average growth rate 
of the low-tax group during 1990-2002 was 1.7 percentage points higher than the average 
for the high tax group. Further, while the average growth rate of the high-tax countries 
was approximately 1 percentage point lower in 1990-2002 than in the 1980s, the growth 
rate of the low tax group was a half of a percentage point higher during the latter period. 
Table 5 uses regression analysis to investigate the linkage between the level of tax 
rates and growth for all of the 77 countries.  The dependent variable is the growth rate of 
per capita GDP during 1990-2002.  Growth of per capita GDP during the 1980s is 
incorporated as an independent control variable.  This variable should capture many of 
the important institutional and cultural factors that influence cross-country differences in 
long-term growth. Put another way, factors like political stability, an even-handed legal 
system, a well-educated and highly skilled labor force, and sound monetary, financial and 
trade institutions that resulted in strong growth during the 1980s are also likely to exert  a 
positive impact on growth during the 1990s. Correspondingly, institutional and cultural 
factors that resulted in weak growth during the 1980s will also tend to retard growth 
during the 1990s.5 The findings are supportive of this view. The coefficient for the 
growth rate during the 1980s was positive and significant in a statistical sense (t-ratios 
near 7.0 in all of the regression equations). 
The average of the top marginal tax rate during 1990-1995 is also incorporated as 
an independent variable.  In Equation 1, the marginal tax rate variable has a negative 
sign.6  This indicates that after controlling for growth during the 1980s, countries with 
higher top marginal tax rates during the 1990s grew less rapidly than those with lower top 
rates. In Equation 2, per capita GDP at the beginning of the period (i.e. 1990) is added to 
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the model. After inclusion of the initial per capita income variable, the marginal tax rate 
variable drops slightly outside of the usual acceptable range for statistical significance. 
The models represented by Equations 3 and 4 are parallel to those of Equations 1 
and 2 except that the EFW top tax rating, which also incorporates the income level at 
which the top marginal rate applies, is used rather than the marginal tax rate itself. The 
rating variable is a more refined measure, and because the higher ratings are indicative of 
lower marginal tax rates (and initial application of high marginal rates at higher levels of 
income), the expected sign of this variable is positive.  As Equations 3 and 4 show, the 
EFW marginal tax rating coefficient is positive. A one point increase in the rating 
variable scale is associated with a five percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate, 
holding constant the income level at which the top rate initially applies. (See Appendix, 
Table A1). Thus, the 0.15 coefficient on the rating variable in Equations 3 and 4 indicates 
that a ten percentage point lower top marginal tax rate is associated with approximately 
three-tenths of a percentage point change in long-term growth. These findings suggest 
that countries with persistently high marginal tax rates pay a price in terms of a slower 
rate of long-term growth.  
B. Economic Growth and Changes in Top Marginal Tax Rates. 
As Table 1 shows, the average top marginal income tax rate among the 77 
countries declined sharply between 1985 and 1995.  This reflects the fact that many 
countries made substantial reductions in their top rate during this period. Table 6 provides 
a list of the countries that reduced their top marginal rate by 25 percentage points or more 
between 1985 and 1995.  This is a diverse list that includes countries from all regions of 
the world. It includes low-income developing countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, and 
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Bangladesh as well as high-income industrial countries like New Zealand and Sweden. In 
some cases, the economies of the tax cutters had high growth rates prior to 1985. 
Botswana and Thailand provide examples. In other cases, like Peru, Ecuador, and Ghana, 
the top rates were slashed against a backdrop of dismal economic performance. 
If marginal tax rates impact growth, countries that reduce their marginal rates 
should grow more rapidly than those that do not.  Table 7 uses regression analysis to 
investigate this issue.  Once again, the dependent variable is the annual growth rate of per 
capita real GDP during 1990-2002. As in Table 5, the growth rate of real GDP during the 
1980s is incorporated as an independent variable in order to adjust for cross-country 
differences in institutional and cultural factors that influence long-term growth. As 
expected, this variable is significant and positively related to growth during 1990-2002. 
In Equations 1 through 3, the change in the top marginal tax rate (measured in 
percentage points) between 1985 and 1990 and between 1990 and 1995 is incorporated as 
a measure of change in the top marginal tax rate. Equation 1 includes only the two 
change-in-tax-rate variables along with the growth rate during the 1980’s in the model. 
Equation 2 adds the per capita GDP at the beginning of the period (1990). Equation 3 
adds the initial top marginal tax rate (1985). The coefficients for both of the changes in 
marginal tax rate variables were negative, and the impact of the change in the top 
marginal rate between 1985 and 1990 was quite similar to the impact of the change in the 
top rate between 1990 and 1995. This is consistent with the view that a reduction in the 
highest marginal rates will influence growth over a lengthy time period. Equation 3 
indicates that, holding the other variables of the model constant, a 10 percentage point 
reduction in the top marginal rate is associated with approximately a 0.5 percentage point 
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increase in long-term growth. The R-squared implies that the model represented by 
Equation 3 accounts for 40 percent of the variation in the growth rate of GDP among the 
77 countries during 1990-2002.  
Equations 4, 5, and 6 are similar to those of Equations 1 through 3 except that the 
marginal tax EFW rating is substituted for the top marginal rates in the case of both the 
change variables and the initial (1985) top marginal tax rate.  In the more comprehensive 
model (Equation 6), a one-unit increase in the rating between 1985 and 1990 enhances 
growth during the 1990s by 0.241 percentage points.  A unit increase in the rating 
between 1990 and 1995 is associated with a 0.304 percentage point increase in growth 
during 1990-2002.  This implies that a 10 percentage point reduction in marginal tax rates 
increases the annual growth rate of an economy by approximately 0.5 to 0.6 percentage 
points. The model represented by Equation 6 accounts for 43.7 percent of the GDP per 
capita variation among the 77 countries.  
These findings are consistent with the view that reductions in marginal tax rates, 
particularly rates that are exceedingly high, influence the growth rate of an economy.  Of 
course,  they are subject to the usual limitations accompanying cross-country regression 
analysis, particularly bias emanating from  an inability to control for other factors 
influencing growth. To the extent that countries reducing their marginal rates between 
1985 and 1995 were more likely to adopt other growth enhancing reforms than the non-
tax cutters, the estimates presented here will overstate the impact of the changes in the 
top tax rates. But, there are also biases in the opposite direction. As we discussed above, 
real GDP (and its growth rate) will fail to register several of the negative side effects 
accompanying high marginal tax rates. This is particularly true of those associated with 
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price distortions and tax avoidance activities. Because the estimates presented here use 
the growth figures for real GDP as a measure of the negative side effects of high marginal 
rates, they will fail to capture fully the distorting effects of high marginal rates.  This 
factor means that the estimates presented here will understate the negative impact of the 
high marginal rates. 
 
V. MARGINAL TAX RATES, INCOME INEQUALITY, AND TAX PAYMENTS 
 
A.  Theoretical Considerations 
Most tax cuts are more or less across-the-board because, from a political 
viewpoint, the lower rates will have to be cut in order to make the cuts in the top brackets 
politically feasible. Thus, it is important to understand that across-the-board cuts in 
marginal tax rates will have different incentive effects up and down the income 
distribution.  Suppose that a government with progressive income tax rates ranging from 
a low of 15 percent to a high of 75 percent reduced tax rates across the board by one-
third. The top tax rate would then fall from 75 percent to 50 percent. After the tax cut, 
taxpayers in the highest tax bracket who earn an additional $100 would get to keep $50 
rather than only $25, a 100 percent increase in the incentive to earn additional income.  
Predictably, these taxpayers will have a strong incentive to earn more taxable income 
after the rate reduction, and the revenues collected from them will decline by 
substantially less than a third. In fact, given the huge increase in their incentive to earn, 
the revenues collected from taxpayers confronting such high marginal rates may actually 
increase, an outcome suggested by the Laffer Curve. 
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Meanwhile, the same 33 percent rate reduction will only cut the bottom tax rate 
from 15 percent to 10 percent.  In this range, the tax cut means that an additional $100 in 
gross pay increases take-home pay by $90 instead of $85, a 5.9 percent increase in the 
incentive to earn additional income. Because cutting the 15 percent rate to 10 percent 
exerts only a small effect on the incentive to earn in the lower tax (and lower income) 
brackets, the incomes of persons in these marginal tax brackets will be largely 
unchanged. Thus, the taxable income base of persons in the lower tax brackets will not be 
altered much by the tax cut.  Therefore, in contrast with the situation in high tax brackets, 
tax revenue will decline by almost the same percent as tax rates in the lowest tax 
brackets. 
The bottom line is that when all rates are cut by approximately the same 
percentage, the increase in the incentive to earn will be greatest in the upper tax (and 
income) brackets. There will be two major side effects of this change in incentive 
structure. First, income inequality will increase. Predictably, the incomes of those in the 
high tax brackets will expand by a larger amount than those in the lower tax brackets. 
Some of this increase in income will reflect a decline in tax avoidance activities and some 
of it will reflect the substitution of work for leisure.  Both will show up as an increase in 
the observed income of persons in the upper tax and upper income brackets.  
Second, a larger share of the income tax will be paid by high-income taxpayers. 
Because the tax cut will increase the incentive to earn more in high than low income 
brackets, taxable income will expand more and the taxes paid will decline less in the 
upper income brackets. When the top marginal rates are extremely high, taxes collected 
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from the high-income taxpayers may even increase. But even if this is not the case,  a 
larger share of the income tax will still be collected from those with high incomes.  
B. Marginal Tax Rates and the Distribution of Income: Empirical Evidence 
If our analysis is correct, even across-the-board rate reductions will lead to an 
increase in income inequality. If the rate reductions are greater in the high tax brackets 
than in the lower brackets, the expected increase in income inequality will be even 
greater. Thus, countries that reduce their highest rates by substantial amounts should 
experience increases in income inequality.  Reliable data on the distribution of income 
are unavailable for many of the 77 countries that comprise the central data base of this 
study. Furthermore, even when income distribution data are available, there are often 
serious problems with comparability across countries.7 Therefore, we are unable to use 
regression analysis to undertake a detailed statistical analysis of this issue.  
Comparable data are available for the United States both before and after the 
major personal income tax cuts that have occurred since 1960.  Data are also available for 
other countries, including several that reduced their rates substantially during a 1985-
1995 period. These data can be compared with data from countries that have persistently 
maintained high marginal tax rates. These comparisons will shed light on the relationship 
between high marginal tax rates and income inequality.  
We will begin by looking at the data for the United States. The personal income 
tax is the largest single source of revenue for the federal government of the United States. 
The rate structure of the income tax is progressive; taxpayers with larger incomes face 
higher tax rates. However, the structure of the rates has changed substantially since 1960. 
In the early 1960s, there were 24 marginal tax brackets ranging from a low of 20 percent 
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to a high of 91 percent. The Kennedy-Johnson tax cut was roughly an across the board 
proportional rate reduction. The 91 percent top rate was sliced to 70 percent and the 20 
percent rate was cut to 14 percent. In 1981, the first tax cut of the Reagan years reduced 
the top rate from 70 percent to 50 percent and the lowest rate was cut from 14 percent to 
10 percent. The second Reagan tax cut sliced the top marginal rate to approximately 30 
percent beginning in 1988. The top rate was increased to 33 percent in 1991 and two 
years later it was increased again to 39.6 percent, but the tax reductions during the 
administration of George W. Bush rolled the top rate back to 35 percent. Thus, since the 
late 1980s, Americans with the highest incomes have paid sharply lower top marginal tax 
rates -- rates in the 30 to 40 percent range compared to top rates of 91 percent in the early 
1960s and 70 percent prior to 1981.  
What has happened to the distribution of income in the United States?  Table 8 
provides income distribution data for the U.S. since 1970 and distributional data after 
taxes (and after taxes and transfers) since 1980. These data highlight two important 
points. First, taxes and transfers reduce the degree of income inequality. In 2001, the 
before-tax income share of the top quintile was approximately 14 times that of the bottom 
quintile. After taxes, the ratio of the income share of the top to bottom quintile was 
approximately ten.  
Second, income inequality in the United States has increased and most of that 
increase has taken place since 1980. Between 1970 and 1980, there was little change in 
the before tax distribution of income. In fact, the income share of the bottom quintile rose 
slightly (from 4.1 percent in 1970 to 4.3 percent in 1980), while the share of the top 5 
percent of earners declined (from 16.6 percent to 15.8 percent) during the decade. Since 
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1980, however, the situation has been dramatically different. The income share of the 
bottom quintile fell from 4.3 percent in 1980 to 3.5 percent in 2001. Over the same time 
period, the income share of the top quintile of earners rose from 43.7 percent to 50.1 
percent, an increase of 6.4 percentage points.  Furthermore, the increase in the income 
share of the top group was entirely the result of the higher incomes registered by the top 5 
percent of earners. Between 1980 and 2001, the income share of the top 5 percent rose 
from 15.8 percent to 22.4 percent,  an increase of 6.6 percentage points. This increase 
more than accounts for the larger income share of the top quintile.  
The changes in the distribution of income after taxes and after taxes and transfers 
followed a similar path. In both cases, the income share of the bottom quintile declined 
during the 1980s and 1990s, and the share of the top quintile rose during both decades. 
Again, the growth of income among the top 5 percent of earners accounted for almost all 
of the increase in the after-tax income share of the top quintile. (Note: data on the income 
share of the top 5 percent after taxes and transfers were unavailable.)  
The increase in income inequality in the U.S. may have other contributing causes. 
Other researchers have argued that increased trade openness and/or demographic 
changes, particularly the increase in the number of both single-parent and duel-earner 
households, have contributed to the increase in inequality.8 However, both the timing and 
structure of the increase in income inequality indicate that reductions in the highest 
marginal tax rates played an important role. The major increases in inequality began with 
the sharp reductions in the top marginal rates during the 1980s. Moreover, almost all of 
the abnormally large increases in income were registered at the very top of the income 
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distribution, precisely the place where the incentive effects of rate reductions are the 
strongest.  
Table 9 presents data on the share of household income derived by the top and 
bottom quintiles in the 1980s and the 1990s-2000s.  These figures are presented for (1) 
countries with persistently low (40 percent or less) top marginal tax rates during the 
1990s and (2) countries with persistently high (50 percent or more) top rates during the 
1980s and 1990s.9  Many of the countries with low top marginal rates during the 1990s 
reduced their top rates substantially between 1985 and 1995. Therefore, to a large degree, 
the persistently low tax group is comprised of countries with substantially lower tax rates 
in the late 1990s than in the early 1980s. 
Two things stand out with regard to the pattern of the data in Table 9. First, the 
income inequality of the countries in the persistently low tax category is greater than for 
those in the persistently high tax group. In the late 1990s, the income share of the top 
quintile of earners was 43 percent or more in all of the countries in the low top marginal 
rate group.  In contrast, the income share of the top quintile was between 35 percent and 
41 percent for all of the countries in the high tax group.  
Second, the general trend appears to be toward more income inequality in the low 
tax countries but less inequality in countries with high top marginal rates.  Income 
inequality rose in five of the nine low tax countries, while the other four experienced no 
significant change.  In contrast, five of the nine high tax countries registered a reduction 
in income inequality during the period, and there was no discernible change in three 
others.  An increase in income inequality was observed in only one (Belgium) of the 
countries in the high tax group. 
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From our perspective, the figures for New Zealand and the United Kingdom are 
particularly interesting.  Among the high income industrial countries, these two countries 
(along with the United States) made the largest tax cuts during the 1980s.  New Zealand 
reduced its top rate from 66 percent in 1985 to 33 percent in 1990.  In the United 
Kingdom, the top marginal rate was reduced from 83 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 
1985 and 40 percent in 1990, and the lower rate has been maintained ever since.  As 
Table 9 shows, the income share derived by the highest quintile of earners increased in 
both countries.  In New Zealand, the income share of the top quintile rose from 40.6 
percent in the early 1980s to 43.8 percent in the late 1990s.  In the UK, the share of the 
top quintile jumped from 41.4 percent in the 1980s to 44.0 percent in the late 1990s.  Like 
the figures for the U.S., the income distribution data for New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom indicate that substantial reductions in the highest marginal rates will lead to 
rapid income growth in the upper income brackets and an increase in the observed 
income inequality.  
One final point about the empirical linkage between lower top tax rates and 
income inequality: Comparisons of the before and after rate reductions will tend to over-
state the change in economic inequality. To some extent, the empirical data reflect the 
fact that the rate reductions increase the visibility of the income of the highest earners. 
High tax rates encourage tax avoidance activities that tend to conceal income, broadly 
defined to include leisure, pleasurable activities, and ability to purchase many goods at a 
low personal cost. For example, when tax rates are high, those confronting the high rates 
take more of their "income" in the form of low-cost luxury offices and automobiles, 
business related vacations in exotic places, pleasurable hobby business activities, and 
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similar benefits that conceal their true income.  As lower rates make these activities less 
profitable, those with high incomes shift away from such activities. As they do so, their 
money income increases and their overall income becomes more visible. In turn, this 
makes it look like their overall income has increased by a larger amount than is really the 
case. 
C. Changes in marginal tax rates and the taxes paid by those with high incomes 
As we previously discussed, changes in the incentive structure indicate that a 
roughly proportional reduction in tax rates will increase both income levels and the share 
of taxes collected from high-income taxpayers.  Because the income base will be more 
responsive in the upper income brackets, the share of taxes collected from those with 
high incomes may even increase if their rates are reduced more than proportionally. 
Table 10 provides data related to this proposition for the United States.  The share 
of the personal income tax collected from those with high incomes is indicated for 
various periods from 1963, when the top federal rate was 91 percent, through 1994-2001, 
when the top federal rate was 39.6 percent. These data show that the share of the personal 
income tax paid by high income Americans has increased substantially since 1963, and 
the increase has been particularly sharp since 1980.  The top 1 percent of earners paid 
33.4 percent of the personal income tax during 1994-2001, up from 19.1 percent in 1980 
and 18.3 percent in 1963.  The top 10 percent of income recipients paid 63.7 percent of 
the personal income tax during 1994-2001, compared to 49.3 percent in 1980 and 47 
percent in 1963.  At the same time, the share of the personal income tax paid by the 
bottom half of the income recipients has steadily fallen from 10.4 percent of the total in 
1963 to 7.0 percent in 1980 and just 4.3 percent during 1994-2001.10 
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How did the sharp top rate reductions of the 1980s affect the share of taxes 
collected from high income taxpayers? When the top marginal rates were in the 30 to 33 
percent range during 1987-1993, the share of the federal income tax collected from the 
top one percent of earners rose to 26.3 percent, up from 19.1 percent in 1980 and 18.3 
percent in 1963. During 1994-2001, the top one percent paid 33.4 percent of the personal 
income tax even though the top marginal rate remained at less than 40 percent throughout 
the period. Furthermore, the personal income taxes collected at the federal level rose to 
almost nine percent of GDP during 1994-2001, higher than for any of the earlier periods. 
Table 11 presents the share of income taxes collected from high income recipients 
before and after major cuts in the top marginal rates for New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, the two other high-income countries that have substantially reduced their top 
marginal rates.  The pattern for both countries is similar to that of the United States.  As 
the top marginal rate in both countries was reduced from more than 60 percent in the 
early 1980s to 40 percent or less during the 1990s, the share of income taxes collected 
from those with high incomes increased.  In New Zealand, the top five percent of earners 
paid 29 percent of the personal income tax in 1998, compared to 25.1 percent in 1981.  
The top one percent paid 12.8 percent of the personal income tax in 1998, up from 9.5 
percent in 1981.  In the United Kingdom, the shift of the tax burden toward those with 
high incomes was even more dramatic.  In 1999, the top 10 percent of earners paid 50 
percent of the personal income tax in the UK, up from 35 percent in 1980. 
Correspondingly, the share paid by the top one percent of income recipients jumped from 
11 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 1999.  At the same time, the share of the income tax 
paid by the bottom half of the income distribution declined substantially. 
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The figures for the United States, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom indicate 
that high marginal tax rates, rates of 50 percent or more for example, will shrink the tax 
base in the upper income brackets and reduce the tax revenue collected from those with 
high incomes. Further, as analysis of the incentive effects suggests, the income base in 
high tax brackets will be highly responsive to rate reductions.  Exceedingly high marginal 
rates can be reduced with little or no loss of revenue.  In fact, in extreme cases, more 
revenue may be collected at the lower rates.  Perhaps policymakers, at least in these three 
countries, have found a way to soak the rich: keep their marginal tax rates relatively 
modest, 40 percent or less. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our findings indicate that high marginal tax rates, particularly rates of 50 percent 
or more, exert an adverse impact on long-term economic growth. We estimate that a 10 
percentage point reduction in a country's top marginal tax rate will enhance the country’s 
long-term annual growth  rate of real GDP by approximately one-half of a percentage 
point (see Table 7). 
 Economic theory indicates that the incentive effects of a proportional reduction in 
marginal tax rates will be greater in the upper income brackets. Therefore, even an 
across-the-board rate cut will result in larger income increases among those with the 
highest income levels. Thus, reductions in high marginal tax rates will tend to increase 
observed income inequality. Our findings are supportive of this view. The income share 
of the highest group of earners tended to increase following major reductions in the 
highest marginal tax rates.  See Tables 8 and 9. 
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However, because of the stronger incentive effects accompanying reductions in 
the highest marginal rates, across the board tax reductions will tend to increase the share 
of taxes paid by those with the highest incomes.  The experience of the United States is 
consistent with this view. Compared to the situation in 1980, when the top marginal tax 
bracket was 70 percent, the share of the personal income tax paid by those with high 
incomes (top five percent for example) has been substantially greater in the United States 
since 1987, even though the top federal income tax rate has been less than 40 percent 
throughout the latter period. The experience of New Zealand and the United Kingdom, 
the other two high-income countries that dramatically reduced their highest marginal tax 
rates in the 1980s, is also supportive of this view. In both cases, the share of the personal 
income tax paid by those with the highest incomes increased following the lowering of 
the top rates. 
In brief, our findings indicate that high marginal tax rates, rates of 50 percent and 
above for example, retard economic growth.  Lowering these rates will increase income 
inequality, but it will also increase the share of the personal income tax collected from 
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Table 1: Average and Median Top Marginal Tax Rates, 1980-2002
Average Median







* The requisite data for 1980 were not available for all 77 countries.  1980 data area based on 68 observations.
Source:
Authors' calculations.  See Table A2.
Table 2:  Countries with Persistently High Tax Rates, 1980-1995
Countries with top 
marginal tax rates in 
excess of 50 percent in 



















Authors' calculations.  See Table A2.
Table 3: Countries with Persistently High and Persistently Low Top Marginal Tax Rates in the 1990s
Countries with top marginal 
tax rates in excess of 60 
percent (including the payroll 
tax) in all years between 1990 
and 2000
Countries with top 
marginal tax rates less 
than 40 percent (including 
the payroll tax) in all years 















Authors' calculations.  See Table A3.
Table 4: Growth Rates of High and Low Top Marginal Tax Rate Countries
1980-90 1990-02 1980-90 1990-02
Austria 2.15% 1.79% Bangladesh 1.13% 2.99%
Belgium 1.89% 1.61% Costa Rica -0.50% 2.45%
Cameroon 0.41% -0.59% Ecuador -0.51% 0.34%
Congo, D. R. -2.02% -7.16% Guatemala -1.61% 1.12%
Denmark 1.54% 1.86% Hong Kong 5.08% 2.50%
Finland 2.67% 1.53% Indonesia 4.44% 2.62%
France 1.94% 1.43% Jamaica 1.36% 0.08%
Israel 1.74% 1.43% Mauritius 4.89% 4.06%
Sweden 1.87% 1.52% New Zealand 0.84% 1.88%
Average 1.35% 0.38% Philippines -0.72% 0.86%
Singapore 4.90% 3.57%
Trinidad/Tobago -1.19% 2.53%
United Kingdom 2.45% 2.02%
Average 1.58% 2.08%
Source:
World Bank. 2004 World Development Indicators.
Real GDP Per Capita Growth Real GDP Per Capita Growth
Countries with top marginal 
tax rates less than 40 percent 
(including the payroll tax) in all 
years between 1990 and 2000
Countries with top marginal tax 
rates in excess of 60 percent 
(including the payroll tax) in all 
years between 1990 and 2000
Table 5:  The Impact of Top Marginal Tax Rates on Economic Growth
Dependent Variable:  GDP per capita growth rate, 1990-2002
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 2.172 2.183 0.227 0.299
GDP per capita growth rate, 1980-90 0.516 0.522 0.511 0.517
(7.04) (6.82) (7.08) (6.84)
GDP per capita, 1990 (ppp US$1000) -0.007 -0.007
(-0.28) (-0.28)
Top marginal tax rate, Average 1990-95 -0.027 -0.026
(1.75) (1.64)
Top marginal tax rate (EFW Rating), Average 1990-95 0.155 0.151
(2.08) (1.99)
Adjusted R-Squared 38.6 37.9 39.6 38.9
Number of Observations 77 77 77 77
Table 6: Countries that Cut Top Marginal Tax Rates the Most Between 1985 and 1995
Countries Reducing Top 
Marginal Tax Rates by More 
than 25 Percentage Points 

























Authors' calculations.  See Table A2.
Table 7:  The Impact of Changes in Top Marginal Tax Rates on Economic Growth
Dependent Variable:  GDP per capita growth rate, 1990-2002
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Independent
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.332 0.361 1.432 0.284 0.240 -0.350
GDP per capita growth rate, 1980-90 0.531 0.533 0.537 0.532 0.528 0.523
(7.23) (6.92) (7.02) (7.48) (7.06) (7.07)
GDP per capita, 1990 (ppp US$1000) 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.014
(0.12) (0.29) (0.19) (0.55)
Top marginal tax rate, 1985 -0.024
(1.47)
Top marginal tax rate (EFW Rating), 1985 0.133
(1.63)
Change in Top marginal tax rate from 1985 to 1990 -0.034 -0.034 -0.049
(1.84) (1.83) (2.33)
Change in Top marginal tax rate  from 1990 to 1995 -0.034 -0.034 -0.048
(2.14) (1.98) (2.46)
Change in Top marginal tax rate (EFW Rating) from 1985 to 1990 0.177 0.177 0.241
(2.03) (2.02) (2.53)
Change in Top marginal tax rate (EFW Rating) from 1990 to 1995 0.239 0.245 0.304
(3.03) (2.91) (3.35)
Adjusted R-Squared 40.0 39.1 40.1 43.1 42.4 43.7
Number of Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77




















1970 4.1 52.7 43.3 16.6
1980 4.3 52.1 43.7 15.8
1990 3.9 49.5 46.6 18.6
2001 3.5 46.3 50.1 22.4
After Taxes*
1980 4.9 54.6 40.6 14.1
1990 4.5 52.0 43.5 16.5
2001 4.4 50.7 44.9 18.2
After Taxes & Transfers*
1980 5.6 54.0 40.3
1990 5.2 51.5 43.3





*Comparable data after taxes and after taxes and transfers were unavailable for 1970.
Table 9: Top Marginal Tax Rates and the Distribution of Income: 


































Bangladesh 60 40 7.2 43.4 1983 9.0 44.5 2000 No Change
Costa Rica 50 25 4.5 51.8 1983 4.2 51.5 2000 No Change
Guatemala 40 25 2.7 62.1 1987 2.6 64.1 2000 Increasing
Hong Kong 15 20 6.2 46.5 1980 5.3 50.7 1996 Increasing
Indonesia 50 30 7.3 42.3 1980 8.4 43.3 2002 No Change
New Zealand 62 33 6.0 40.6 1980 6.4 43.8 1997 Increasing
Philippines 70 35 5.2 52.1 1985 5.4 52.3 2000 No Change
Singapore 55 30 6.5 46.6 1980 5.0 49.0 1998 Increasing





Austria 62 50 6.6 38.6 1981 8.1 38.5 1997 No Change
Belgium 76 61 8.6 34.7 1985 8.3 37.3 1996 Increasing
Denmark 66 64 6.7 37.2 1981 8.3 35.8 1997 Decreasing
Finland 68 57 6.8 36.9 1987 9.6 36.7 2000 Decreasing
France 60 51 6.6 42.0 1984 7.2 40.2 1995 Decreasing
Germany 65 57 6.8 37.4 1981 8.5 36.9 2000 Decreasing
Japan 75 65 6.3 39.6 1980 10.6 35.7 1993 Decreasing
Netherlands 72 60 6.1 39.8 1983 7.3 40.1 1994 No Change
Sweden 87 50 9.0 35.3 1981 9.1 36.6 2000 No Change
Sources:
1980s income distribution data are from Deininger and Squire Data Set, A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality, 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm
1990s income distribution data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004
*The 'No Change' label indicates that the average difference between the two periods for the top and bottom quintiles was less than one percentage point.
Note: The income distribution data were unavailable for some countries.
Table 10: Marginal Tax Rates and Incomes Taxes Paid by Various Income Groups in the U.S., 1963-2001





Receipts as a 
Share of 
GDP  Bottom 50% Top 10%  Top 5% Top 1%
1963 91 7.71 10.4 47.0 35.6 18.3
1980 70 8.75 7.0 49.3 36.8 19.1
1981-1986 50 8.30 7.2 50.5 38.0 20.9
1987-1993 30-33 7.90 5.5 56.7 44.7 26.3
1994-2001 39.6 8.99 4.3 63.7 52.3 33.4
Sources:
Internal Revenue Service (available online at the Tax Foundation’s website: http://www.taxfoundation.org/prtop
Economic Report of the President, 2005.  Table B-80
Share of Federal Income Tax Paid by
Table 11: Marginal Tax Rates and Incomes Taxes Paid by Various Income Groups in New Zealand and the United Kingdom
New Zealand
Top Marginal
Tax Rate Bottom 50% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
1981 62 12.4 38.0 25.1 9.5
1991 33 13.6 37.3 25.3 10.6
1998 39 12.2 41.3 29.0 12.8
United Kingdom
1980 83 18.0 35.0 n.a. 11.0
1990 40 15.0 42.0 n.a. 15.0
1999 40 11.0 50.0 n.a. 20.0
Sources:
New Zealand, Inland Revenue memo to New Zealand Business Roundtable.
Adam Smith Institute
Share of Income Tax Paid By:
Table A1:  Top Marginal Tax Rates, Income Thresholds, and EFW Ratings
Top Marginal 
Tax Rate Less than $25,000 25,000 to 50,000 50,000 to 150,000 More than $150,000
Less than 20% 10 10 10 10
21 to 25 9 9 10 10
26 to 30 8 8 9 9
31 to 35 7 7 8 9
36 to 40 5 6 7 8
41 to 45 4 5 6 7
46 to 50 3 4 5 5
51 to 55 2 3 4 4
56 to 60 1 2 3 3
61 tp 65 0 1 2 2
66 to 70 0 0 1 1
More than 70% 0 0 0 0
Note: Countries with higher marginal tax rates that take effect at lower income thresholds received lower ratings based on the matrix found a
Source:
James Gwartney and Robert Lawson. Economic Freedom of the World, 2004 Annual Report (Vancou
Income Threshold Level (1982-84 US$)
Table A2:  Top Marginal Tax Rates on Personal Income (excluding payroll taxes) and EFW Ratings, 1980-2002
Countries Tax Rate Rating Tax Rate Rating Tax Rate Rating Tax Rate Rating Tax Rate Rating Tax Rate Rating Tax Rate Rating
Argentina 45 6 62 2 35 7 30 9 35 8 35 7 40.3 6.5
Australia 62 2 60 2 49 3 47 4 47 3 47 3 52.0 2.8
Austria 62 2 62 2 50 4 50 4 50 4 50 4 54.0 3.3
Bangladesh 60 1 60 1 25 9 25 9 25 9 25 9 36.7 6.3
Barbados 60 1 60 1 50 4 40 5 40 5 40 5 48.3 3.5
Belgium 76 0 76 0 58 2 61 1 60 2 52 2 63.9 1.2
Belize 50 4 45 4 45 5 45 5 45 5 46.0 4.6
Bolivia 48 3 30 8 10 10 13 10 13 10 13 10 21.2 8.5
Botswana 75 0 60 2 50 3 35 7 25 9 25 9 45.0 5.0
Brazil 55 4 60 1 25 9 35 8 28 8 28 8 38.4 6.3
Cameroon 60 2 60 1 66 0 69 0 65 0 64.0 0.6
Canada 64 2 57 2 49 4 49 4 48 3 34 5 50.1 3.3
Chile 58 2 56 2 50 4 45 6 45 5 40 5 49.0 4.0
China 45 6 45 5 45 6 45 6 45 4 45.0 5.4
Colombia 56 2 49 5 30 8 30 8 35 7 35 7 39.2 6.2
Congo, Dem. R. 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 60 1 50 3 58.3 1.3
Costa Rica 50 5 50 3 25 9 25 9 25 9 30 8 34.2 7.2
Cote d'Ivoire 45 5 45 5 45 4 49 3 49 3 49 3 47.0 3.8
Cyprus 60 1 60 1 60 1 40 5 40 5 30 8 48.3 3.5
Denmark 66 0 73 0 68 0 64 1 59 2 59 1 64.8 0.7
Dominican Rep. 73 0 73 0 73 0 25 9 25 9 25 9 49.0 4.5
Ecuador 50 5 58 2 25 9 25 9 25 9 25 9 34.7 7.2
Egypt 80 0 65 2 65 2 50 3 34 7 34 7 54.7 3.5
El Salvador 60 3 48 3 60 2 30 8 30 8 30 8 43.0 5.3
Fiji 53 2 50 3 50 3 35 7 34 7 32 7 42.3 4.8
Finland 68 1 67 1 60 2 57 2 54 3 54 3 60.0 2.0
France 60 3 65 1 53 3 51 4 54 2 53 2 56.0 2.5
Germany 65 2 65 1 53 4 57 3 56 3 51 4 57.8 2.8
Ghana 60 1 60 1 55 2 35 7 30 8 30 8 45.0 4.5
Greece 60 3 63 1 50 4 45 5 43 5 40 5 50.1 3.8
Guatemala 40 8 48 5 34 7 25 9 31 7 31 7 34.8 7.2
Honduras 40 8 46 5 46 5 40 7 25 9 25 9 37.0 7.2
Hong Kong 15 10 25 9 25 9 20 10 17 10 17 10 19.8 9.7
Iceland 63 0 56 1 40 5 47 4 45 6 46 5 49.5 3.5
India 60 1 62 0 53 2 40 5 30 8 32 7 46.2 3.8
Indonesia 50 3 35 7 35 7 30 8 35 7 35 7 36.7 6.5
Iran 90 0 75 0 54 4 54 2 35 8 61.6 2.8
Ireland 60 1 65 0 56 1 48 3 42 5 42 5 52.2 2.5
Israel 66 1 60 3 48 5 50 4 50 4 50 4 54.0 3.5
Italy 72 0 81 0 66 1 67 1 51 3 47 4 64.0 1.5
Jamaica 80 0 58 1 33 7 25 9 25 9 25 9 41.0 5.8
Japan 75 0 70 1 65 2 65 2 50 5 50 5 62.5 2.5
Kenya 65 1 65 0 50 3 50 3 32 7 30 8 48.7 3.7
Malawi 45 4 50 3 50 3 35 7 38 5 38 5 42.7 4.5
Malaysia 60 2 45 6 45 6 32 7 29 8 28 8 39.8 6.2
Malta 65 0 65 0 65 0 35 7 35 7 35 7 50.0 3.5
Mauritius 50 3 35 7 35 7 30 8 25 9 25 9 33.3 7.2
Mexico 55 4 55 4 40 7 35 7 40 7 35 7 43.3 6.0
Morocco 64 2 87 0 87 0 46 3 44 4 44 4 62.0 2.2
Netherlands 72 0 72 0 60 3 60 2 52 3 52 2 61.3 1.7
New Zealand 62 2 66 0 33 7 33 7 39 5 39 5 45.3 4.3
Nigeria 70 0 55 3 55 2 35 7 25 9 25 9 44.2 5.0
Norway 75 0 64 1 51 3 42 5 48 5 48 5 54.6 3.2
Pakistan 55 2 60 1 50 3 45 4 35 7 35 7 46.7 4.0
Panama 56 3 56 3 56 3 30 9 31 8 31 8 43.4 5.7
Paraguay 30 8 30 8 0 10 0 10 0 10 12.0 9.2
Peru 65 2 65 0 45 4 30 8 20 10 30 8 42.5 5.3
Philippines 70 1 60 1 35 7 35 7 32 7 32 7 44.0 5.0
Portugal 84 0 69 0 40 5 40 5 40 6 40 6 52.2 3.7
Senegal 65 1 48 4 64 0 50 3 50 3 55.4 2.2
Singapore 55 4 40 8 33 9 30 9 28 9 22 10 34.7 8.2
South Africa 60 2 50 4 45 5 43 4 45 4 40 5 47.2 4.0
South Korea 89 0 65 2 64 2 48 5 44 5 40 6 58.3 3.3
Spain 66 1 66 1 56 3 56 2 48 4 40 5 55.3 2.7
Sweden 87 0 80 0 65 0 50 3 55 2 56 3 65.4 1.3
Switzerland 37 7 40 7 38 8 37 8 36 9 36 9 37.3 8.0
Taiwan 60 3 60 3 50 5 40 7 40 7 40 7 48.3 5.3
Tanzania 95 0 50 3 30 8 31 7 31 7 47.4 5.0
Thailand 60 3 65 2 55 4 37 7 37 7 37 6 48.5 4.8
Trinidad & Tob. 50 4 35 7 38 5 35 7 30 8 37.6 6.2
Turkey 75 0 63 2 50 4 55 4 45 6 40 6 54.7 3.7
Uganda 70 0 50 3 30 8 30 8 30 8 42.0 5.4
United Kingdom 83 0 60 2 40 5 40 5 40 6 40 6 50.5 4.0
United States 73 0 55 4 38 7 43 7 43 7 40 8 48.7 5.5
Venezuela 45 7 45 7 45 7 34 7 35 8 34 7 39.7 7.2
Zambia 70 0 80 0 75 0 35 7 30 8 30 8 53.3 3.8
Zimbabwe 45 5 63 0 60 1 45 4 53 2 46 3 52.0 2.5
Average 61.3 2.2 59.2 2.4 48.5 4.2 40.8 5.6 38.6 6.1 37.1 6.2 47.3 4.5
Median 60 2 60 2 50 4 40 6 39 7 35 7 48 4
Number 68 68 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
Source:
James Gwartney and Robert Lawson. Economic Freedom of the World, 2004 Annual Report  (Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 2004).
2000 2002 Average 1980-20001980 1985 1990 1995
Table A3:  Top Marginal Tax Rates on Personal Income (including payroll taxes): 1990, 1995, 2000
Countries 1990 1995 2000
Argentina 57 40 40
Australia 49 48 49
Austria 62 66 66
Bangladesh 25 25 25
Barbados 54 53 53
Belgium 70 61 71
Belize
Bolivia 16 22
Botswana 50 35 25
Brazil 53 60 55
Cameroon 63 69 68
Canada 49 49 48
Chile 50 45 45
China
Colombia 30 30 43
Congo, Dem. R 60 63 63
Costa Rica 33 33 39
Cote d'Ivoire
Cyprus 62 48 48
Denmark 69 67 63
Dominican Rep 73 25 25
Ecuador 32 32 32
Egypt
El Salvador
Fiji 50 35 34
Finland 65 63 62
France 61 60 64
Germany 53 57 56
Ghana 62 45 41
Greece 50 45 50
Guatemala 37 28 34
Honduras 46 40 25
Hong Kong 25 20 17
Iceland 48
India 53 40 30
Indonesia 35 40 40
Iran 75 54 57
Ireland 57 51 42
Israel 64 66 62
Italy 66 67 52
Jamaica 37 31 31
Japan 69 69 50
Kenya 50 50 32
Malawi 50 35 38
Malaysia 45 32 29
Malta 65 35 35
Mauritius 35 32 33
Mexico 47
Morocco
Netherlands 63 63 54
New Zealand 33 33 40
Nigeria 25
Norway 64 56 64
Pakistan 50 45 35
Panama 64 38 38
Paraguay
Peru 48 39 41
Philippines 35 35 32
Portugal 57 57 57
Senegal 48 64 50
Singapore 33 30 28
South Africa 45 43 45
South Korea 66 48 44
Spain 56 56 48
Sweden 83 70 72
Switzerland 41 40 44
Taiwan 50 40 40
Tanzania 57 45 46
Thailand 55 37 37
Trinidad & Tob. 35 38 35
Turkey 57 55 46
Uganda 59 41 40
United Kingdom 40 40 40
United States 41 46 46
Venezuela 45 34 35
Zambia
Zimbabwe 60 45 53
Average 51.4 45.5 44.1
Median 52 45 43
Number 66 66 68
Source:
James Gwartney and Robert Lawson. Economic Freedom of the World, 2004 Annual Report  (Vancouver, BC: Fraser Institute, 2004).
